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MEASURES WITH MULTIPLE PURPOSES: PUZZLES FROM EC—SEAL PRODUCTS 
Donald H. Regan* 
European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of  Seal Products1 is the first case in which 
the dispute system of  the World Trade Organization (WTO) has wrestled with a regulation that pursued mul-
tiple conflicting, legitimate purposes. (I will explain later why Brazil—Retreaded Tyres2 is not such a case.) This 
generates puzzles about applying the definition of  a “technical regulation” to complex measures; about whether 
an exception to a ban can be justified by a purpose different from that of  the ban; and about how to apply “less 
restrictive alternative” analysis to measures with multiple goals. The first of  these puzzles is unique to the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)3; the second and third concern the TBT, the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)4, and probably other agreements.  
The European Union (EU) seal products regulation banned the local production, sale, or import of  seal and 
seal products, on “public morals” grounds.  The asserted purpose of  the ban was to protect the moral sensibil-
ities of  European citizens who would be offended by the marketing in the EU of  products from seals that were 
killed inhumanely.5 For convenience, I shall refer to this as the “seal welfare” purpose (even though it is formally 
about moral feelings, not actual seal welfare). There was an exception to the ban that allowed the marketing of  
seal products from seals killed by members of  Inuit communities on traditional hunts.6 The purpose of  this 
exception was to help preserve Inuit culture. The seal welfare purpose and the Inuit culture purpose are both 
genuine and legitimate purposes. But in the case of  seal products from Inuit hunts, which involve some inhu-
mane seal killing, the purposes conflict. The EU resolved the conflict in that case in favor of  the Inuit, and 
against the seals.7 
 
* William W. Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor of  Law at the University of  Michigan Law School. 
Originally published online 25 June 2015. 
1 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of  Seal Products, 
WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (Adopted June 18, 2014) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products]. 
2 Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of  Retreaded Tyres, WT/332/AB/R (Adopted Dec. 17, 2007). 
3 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1A, 1868 UNTS 120. 
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 187. 
5 Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  16 September 2009 on trade in seal products 
(Text with EEA relevance), 2009 O.J. (L 286) 36. 
6 Commission Regulation (EU) No 737/2010 of  10 August 2010 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of  Regulation 
(EC) No 1007/2009 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on trade in seal products (Text with EEA relevance), 2010 O.J. (L 
216) 1. 
7 For discussion of  a variety of  important questions about this case that do not specially implicate multiple purposes, see Philip Levy 
& Donald Regan, EC—Seal Products: Seals and Sensibilities (TBT Aspects of  the Panel and Appellate Body Reports), 14 WORLD TRADE REV. 
337 (2015). 
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Is the EU seal products regime a “technical regulation”? 
The EU seal products regime was challenged under both the TBT and the GATT. So the first issue under 
the TBT was whether the regime was a “technical regulation.” The Panel said yes; the Appellate Body said no 
(or “not proved”). Neither tribunal produced a satisfactory analysis.  
The Panel begins by citing the suggestion of  the Appellate Body in EC—Asbestos8 that a ban on asbestos-
containing products lays down a product characteristic and hence is a technical regulation, while a ban on 
natural asbestos does not lay down a product characteristic, since asbestos is a product.9 On this ground, the Panel 
suggests that the seals regime (the “measure”) is a technical regulation insofar as it bans products that contain 
seal, but not insofar as it bans pure seal products. The Panel may suggest that the measure as a whole is a 
technical regulation because of  its application to seal-containing products, but that is not clear. In any case, the 
Panel eventually finds another ground that clearly applies to the measure in both its aspects. In effect, the Panel 
finds that “having been killed by an Inuit” is a “product characteristic.” So the Inuit exception, which applies 
to all sorts of  seal products, lays down a product characteristic, and the whole measure is a technical regulation. 
This is unpersuasive. Aside from the fact that “having been killed by an Inuit” does not sound like anything we 
would normally regard as a “product characteristic”, the Panel’s approach would mean that every process and 
production method (PPM) lays down a product characteristic, which makes the reference to PPM’s in the def-
inition of  technical regulations surplusage.10 
The Appellate Body brusquely rejects the idea that “having been killed by an Inuit” is a product characteris-
tic.11 It also accepts the EC—Asbestos-based distinction between pure seal products and seal-containing 
products. So it has now identified three features of  the measure that bear on whether it is a technical regulation: 
(1) the fact that the measure generally bans seal-containing products counts in favor of  its being a technical 
regulation; (2) the fact that the measure generally bans pure seal products counts against; and (3) the fact that 
the Inuit exception does not lay down a product characteristic counts against. What to do with these three 
propositions? The Appellate Body says repeatedly both that the decision whether the measure is a technical 
regulation must be made in respect of  the measure as a whole, and that the tribunal must try to identify the 
essential feature of  the measure. There is plainly some tension between these ideas. And the tension is reflected 
in a lack of  clarity about how the Appellate Body finally decides the case. At some points, it seems to say that 
of  the three listed features of  the measure, two count against its being a technical regulation, and only one 
counts in favor, so the weight is against. Elsewhere the Appellate Body says that the seal regime “is not con-
cerned with banning the placing on the EU market of  seal products as such,” but rather is concerned with 
regulating which hunters’ seal products can come in, so the Inuit exception is the “main feature of  the measure.” 
And hence the measure is not a technical regulation.12   
Both of  the Appellate Body’s analyses are unpersuasive.  The “nose-counting over features” approach is too 
insensitive to how we individuate features, and it would break down if  the EU had simply banned seal products 
with no exceptions (there would be one feature pointing in each direction). On the other hand, trying to identify 
the “main feature” of  a complex measure is often senseless. In this case, the Appellate Body’s claim that the 
 
8 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, 
WT/DS235/AB/R (Adopted Apr. 5, 2001). 
9 Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of  Seal Products, para. 7.104, 
WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R (Adopted June 18, 2014). 
10 Alexia Herwig makes the same point in Too much Zeal on Seals? Animal Welfare, Public Morals and Consumer Ethics at the Bar of  the WTO, 
15 WORLD TRADE REV. 109 (2016).   
11 Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 1, at para. 5.45. 
12 Id. at para. 5.58. 
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Inuit exception is the “main feature” of  the measure is implausible. There would be no reason to have an Inuit 
exception if  there were not a prior reason (seal welfare) to ban seal products; there would be no regulation at 
all. To my mind, the ban and the exception are equally essential aspects of  the measure. But if  anything is 
primary, it must be the ban. It is the ban that embodies the purpose that called the whole scheme into existence. 
Whatever the shortcomings of  the Appellate Body’s analysis of  this issue, I think the Appellate Body got the 
right result, and probably for the right underlying reasons. There is simply nothing “technical” about this meas-
ure, neither in the ban on seal products nor in the Inuit exception. We need an approach to deciding whether a 
measure is a “technical regulation” that reflects the presence of  the word “technical” in that phrase, in the title 
of  the Agreement, and in many dozens of  provisions. Note also, the Preamble to the TBT mentions a goal of  
encouraging “transfer of  technology.” And as the Seal Products Appellate Body itself  points out, TBT Article 
2.9 presupposes that technical regulations have at least some “technical content.”  
Of  course, the word “technical” is far from self-defining. But it is helpful to ask why we have a special 
agreement about “technical” barriers to trade at all. Article 2, which is the heart of  the TBT, differs from the 
GATT in two ways: it applies to a narrower range of  measures (only to “technical regulations”); and it applies 
additional disciplines (a free-standing “least restrictive alternative” requirement, and a conditional obligation to 
use international standards). These two divergences from the GATT ought to be connected. More specifically, 
the narrower range of  application ought to explain the appropriateness of  the additional disciplines. The natural 
suggestion is that, like the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)13, the TBT is about 
measures where established scientific methods can be brought to bear in reviewing regulatory choices (more so 
than with the general run of  GATT measures). The availability of  scientific methods both makes well-grounded 
international standards more likely, and makes the identification of  equally effective less restrictive alternatives 
more reliable. But then, we must interpret “technical regulation” in such a way that established scientific meth-
ods are in fact distinctively relevant. 
I have no space to develop this approach here, but it would require reconsidering our (still limited) jurispru-
dence about what is a technical regulation from the ground up. To give just one example, consider a hypothetical 
version of  the EU seals regime. If  the EU had thought that adequate monitoring was possible, it might have 
laid down precise requirements on how seals must be killed if  their products are to be marketed in the EU. 
There might be rules on the distance from which seals could be shot; on the caliber and type of  ammunition; 
on the maximum wind velocity and current when the shot is taken; on the design of  the boats (to allow a steady 
shot); on the weight and design of  clubs used for stunning seals; and so on. The effects of  all of  these standards 
might be tested by scientific studies. These rules about permissible seal hunting techniques (a perfectly natural 
word choice here) seem like good candidates for being a “technical regulation.”  
Notice that in reviewing this regime, there would be no reason at all to distinguish between its application to 
pure seal products and to seal-containing products. So to get the right result, we have to give up the Asbestos 
distinction. That distinction is suspect anyway. Absent evidence to the contrary, the reasons for excluding nat-
ural asbestos seem to be precisely as “technical” as the reasons for excluding asbestos-containing products. 
There is much work to be done to develop a jurisprudence along the lines I suggest. But we do not have a clear 
jurisprudence now on what is a “technical regulation”. In the end, a sensibly grounded jurisprudence will be 
more predictable and will get better results.14 
 
13 Agreement on the Application of  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 493. 
14 Note in passing that the “technical content” approach could still allow us, without great strain, to regard all labeling rules as 
technical regulations, even if  they are about “non-technical” aspects of  the product. The label is an important aspect of  a product as 
people consider purchasing it; and we can test the efficacy of  various labels in communicating information. 
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None of  this final discussion on “technical content” addresses directly the problem of  complex regulations. 
But it suggests that the right approach might be to say that a measure is a technical regulation if  any significant 
aspect of  it involves technical content, and then to apply the special disciplines of  the TBT only to the measure’s 
technical aspects.  
II. Must an exception to a ban be justified by the same purpose as the ban? 
Both the Panel and the Appellate Body in EC—Seal Products claim to find in Brazil—Tyres the rule that an 
exception to a ban cannot be justified by a different purpose than the ban. I shall refer to this as the “Brazil—
Tyres pseudo-rule.” “Pseudo-rule” for three reasons: First, it is a bad rule. Second, if  the Brazil—Tyres Appellate 
Body actually meant to announce it, it was on the basis of  a misreading of  U.S.—Shrimp15. And third, even the 
Brazil—Tyres Appellate Body does not seem wholeheartedly committed to the pseudo-rule. 
The Panel in EC—Seal Products, having identified the Brazil—Tyres pseudo-rule, decides that it doesn’t have 
to apply it to the present case. But as the Appellate Body points out, they don’t give any very clear explanation 
of  why not. The Appellate Body does not simply ignore the pseudo-rule; but what exactly they do with it is 
unclear. Lorand Bartels, who disapproves of  the pseudo-rule (at least as a strict rule), argues that the Seal Products 
Appellate Body does not treat a violation of  the pseudo-rule as in itself a violation of  the GATT Article XX 
chapeau, but rather treats it as just one factor that counts against the legality of  the regulation.16 I share Bartels’s 
dislike of  the pseudo-rule, but I am less sanguine than he is about the Appellate Body’s position. The Appellate 
Body is unclear, but the frequency with which they mention the pseudo-rule, and the fact that they give it pride 
of  place in their summary of  why the regulation violates the chapeau, suggests that they at least give it substan-
tial weight as evidence for a violation.17 In any event, we should not be satisfied just because the Appellate Body 
arguably does not treat a violation of  the pseudo-rule as conclusive of  illegality. They should give the pseudo-rule 
no weight at all. 
Responsible regulation often involves taking account of  different, and conflicting, purposes. That means 
making trade-offs, often by a regulation in the form of  a ban with exceptions. And discrimination introduced 
by an exception is not rendered “arbitrary,” or “unjustifiable,” or a “disguised restriction” just because the 
purpose of  the exception is different from the purpose of  the ban. The only shadow of  a reason for saying an 
exception cannot be justified by a different purpose from the ban is the suggestion that multiple purposes are 
evidence of  disguised discrimination. In EC—Seal Products, for example, it could be suggested that the Inuit 
exception means the EU does not really care about seal welfare. But this is thoroughly implausible. There is 
completely persuasive evidence that the EU, like many other countries, cares about seal welfare. Indeed, on the 
facts of  this case, there was no possible purpose for the ban other than protecting seals. The regulation could 
not have been primarily about advantaging the Greenland Inuit, because it apparently harmed even them, by 
making consumers more conscious of  the harm to seals from all seal hunts.18 
It might be said that in regulations with claimed multiple purposes, there are more opportunities for disguising 
discriminatory intent. That may be a reason for looking more carefully at the multiple purposes; but it is not in 
itself  evidence that any claimed purpose is illegitimate. It is also true that the existence of  the Inuit exception (for 
example) puts an upper bound on the strength of  the European Union’s commitment to seal welfare. But of  
course the location of  that upper bound depends on the strength of  the European Union’s commitment to 
 
15 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of  Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Adopted 
Nov. 6, 1998). 
16 Lorand Bartels, The Chapeau of  the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreement, 109 AJIL 95 (2015). 
17 Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 1, at para. 5.45. 
18 See Kevin McGwin, EU ban blamed for rapid decline of  Greenland sealing, ARCTIC J. (Mar. 14, 2014). 
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preserving Inuit culture. And in any event, a possibly weaker commitment to seal welfare (entailed by the upper 
bound) is not the same as a disguised commitment to something else entirely. In sum, there is no ground for 
thinking that having a ban justified by one purpose and an exception justified by a different purpose should 
count substantively against a regulation at all. A prophylactic rule against multiple purposes might still make sense 
if  innocent regulations with multiple purposes were rare. But in fact, they are the very stuff  of  law making.  
Let us now consider the origins of  the Brazil—Tyres pseudo-rule. The only justification the Brazil—Tyres 
Appellate Body suggests for the pseudo-rule is the following passage discussing U.S.—Shrimp19: 
We note, for example, that one of  the bases on which the Appellate Body relied in U.S.—Shrimp for 
concluding that the operation of  the measure at issue resulted in unjustifiable discrimination was that 
one particular aspect of  the application of  the measure (the measure implied that, in certain circum-
stances, shrimp caught abroad using methods identical to those employed in the United States would be 
excluded from the United States market) was ‘difficult to reconcile with the declared objective of  pro-
tecting and conserving sea turtles’. Accordingly, we have difficulty understanding how discrimination 
might be viewed as complying with the chapeau of  Article XX when the alleged rationale for discrimi-
nating does not relate to the pursuit of  or would go against the objective that was provisionally found 
to justify a measure under a paragraph of  Article XX.20 
But the final sentence here, taken at face value, is a non sequitur, a serious over-generalization from U.S.—
Shrimp. In U.S.—Shrimp, the United States did not offer any justification for its discrimination against certain 
shrimpers who used U.S.-style turtle excluding devices (TED) that was different from the underlying turtle-
protection rationale of  the regime. The United States did not assert multiple purposes. It asserted one and only 
one purpose, turtle-protection. And so, far from objecting to an exception based on a second purpose, the 
U.S.—Shrimp Appellate Body actually objected to the lack of  an exception (for TED-users from non-certified 
countries) that was required by the United States’ one purpose. In sum, there is no reason at all to think the 
U.S.—Shrimp Appellate Body meant to announce the Brazil—Tyres pseudo-rule. 
Finally, as noted above, even the Brazil—Tyres Appellate Body does not seem wholeheartedly committed to 
the pseudo-rule. Notice first that they did not need the pseudo-rule to find Brazil in violation, because the 
purpose behind the Mercosur exception was illegitimate considered just in itself. It is doubtful whether Brazil 
actually had an obligation under Mercosur to admit retreaded tyres, except because of  its own choice in the 
Mercosur litigation not to rely on Mercosur’s Article XX equivalent. And in any event, a WTO respondent 
cannot avoid its WTO obligation just by pointing to a conflicting obligation imposed by a treaty to which the 
WTO complainant is not a party. (GATT Article XXIV specifically allows this in some cases, but the Brazil—
Tyres Appellate Body explains why there is no Article XXIV defense in this case.21) The Appellate Body never 
says in so many words that the purpose behind the Mercosur exception is illegitimate. But they do develop the 
points I have just summarized, which are quite unnecessary for the application of  the pseudo-rule. Which 
suggests they were reluctant to rely on the pseudo-rule by itself.  
In the end, neither U.S.—Shrimp nor Brazil—Tyres has any bearing at all on a case like EC—Seal Products. 
Neither U.S.—Shrimp nor Brazil—Tyres involved an exception based on a legitimate purpose. 
 
19 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of  Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note 15. 
20 Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of  Retreaded Tyres, supra note 2, at para. 227, discussing Appellate 
Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of  Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note 15, at para. 165 (citations omitted). 
21 Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of  Retreaded Tyres, supra note 2, at para. 234, n.445. 
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How do we apply less restrictive alternative analysis to multiple purposes?  
Once we have established that regulations with multiple, conflicting purposes are permitted, the question 
arises how we apply less restrictive alternative analysis to such regulations. Both the Panel and Appellate Body 
conducted their explicit less restrictive alternative analysis only in terms of  the seal welfare purpose. This did 
no harm in this case, but we will see that it could. We will also see that when the Panel and Appellate Body 
eventually found a violation in the disparate impact on Canadian Inuit and Greenland Inuit seal products, they 
implicitly engaged in a less restrictive alternative analysis that involved both the seal welfare and Inuit culture 
purposes. 
Let us first see why a less restrictive alternative analysis that focuses only on one purpose can produce unac-
ceptable results. In EC—Seal Products, if  we ask simply whether the regulation is necessary for the protection 
of  Inuit culture, the answer is clearly no. Repealing the regulation entirely would be less trade restrictive, and 
probably better for the Inuit.22 But plainly we should not require the EU to use this alternative, which leaves 
one of  their legitimate goals, seal welfare, totally unprotected. If  we ask instead whether the regulation is nec-
essary for the seal welfare goal, it is not quite so obvious how we can get an unacceptable result. On the one 
hand, an alternative cannot logically be less restrictive of  Greenland Inuit seal products, which are currently 
admitted. On the other hand, both Panel and Appellate Body regard it as established that any alternative that 
was less restrictive of  other seal products (either commercial, or Canadian Inuit de facto) would achieve less seal 
welfare. So it appears that any less trade restrictive measure would reduce seal welfare. But this overlooks a 
possibility. Suppose that the Inuit hunt does more damage to seal welfare, per seal killed, than the commercial 
hunt. (The Panel discusses evidence that points both ways on this issue: commercial hunters may be under 
pressure to kill more seals faster; but Inuit hunters sometimes use nets.) For convenience, let us assign hypo-
thetical numbers that almost certainly overstate any actual difference. Let us imagine that ten thousand dollars 
worth of  Inuit seal products are accompanied by the inhumane killing of  ten seals, whereas ten thousand dollars 
worth of  commercial seal products are accompanied by the inhumane killing of  only five seals. Now suppose 
we impose a quota on Inuit seal imports that reduces the value imported by five thousand dollars; and at the 
same time we open a quota for commercial seal imports totaling ten thousand dollars. The result will be five 
thousand dollars more trade overall, and the same total number of  inhumanely killed seals (five fewer from the Inuit 
hunt, and five more from the commercial hunt). So this is a less restrictive alternative. But again it should be 
clear that requiring the EU to use this alternative would be unacceptable, because that would ignore the EU’s 
desired level of  achievement of  the Inuit culture goal. 
So we have to attend to both goals, and the question is, what do we mean by a “less restrictive alternative” 
when the regulation pursues multiple goals? It is a commonplace of  existing less restrictive alternative doctrine 
that the regulating Member is entitled to achieve its own chosen level of  protection. The phrase “own level of  
protection” seems to presuppose that the regulation has just one goal. But there is an obvious generalization 
of  the “own level of  protection” idea. When the regulation serves multiple, conflicting goals, which require 
trade-offs, then a less restrictive alternative must leave the regulator at least as well off  as the actual measure, by 
reference to the regulator’s own evaluation of  the combined achievement of  the various goals. To make the idea clearer, note 
that there is a standard realization of  this idea, when the world is sufficiently well behaved, in terms of  the 
regulator’s indifference curves, which summarize the trade-offs between the goals that leave the regulator 
equally well off, at various levels of  satisfaction. If  the regulator’s preferences can be represented by indifference 
curves, then we can say that an eligible “alternative” must leave the regulator on the same or a higher indiffer-
ence curve.   
 
22 See Kevin McGwin, supra note 18, and accompanying text. 
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Of  course, the regulator’s preferences may not be representable by traditional indifference curves, if, for 
example, the goods (or the preferences) are “lumpy”. And even if  there are well-behaved indifference curves 
in principle, the reviewing tribunal will normally not be able to construct them in any detail from the very 
limited behavioral evidence it has of  the regulator’s preferences. But that impossibility does not give the tribunal 
warrant to evaluate the goals, or to make the trade-offs, for itself. So in practice, a less restrictive alternative will 
often have to be one that achieves at least as much of  every goal as the actual measure. Still, what is required in 
principle is not that the alternative should achieve at least as much of  every goal as the actual measure. What is 
required in principle is that the alternative should leave the regulator at least as well off  as the actual measure, 
by the regulator’s own lights, in view of  the trade-offs it would make. 
Once we have multiple goals, there is room for all sorts of  interactions, and sometimes the structure of  the 
regulatory problem will allow the tribunal to plausibly extrapolate the regulator’s preferences and find a less 
restrictive alternative that achieves enough more of  one regulatory goal to make up (by the regulator’s own 
lights) for achieving less of  some other. That seems to be what lies behind the holding in the present case that 
the EU did not treat Canadian Inuit and Greenland Inuit even-handedly. After all, there is a prima facie justifi-
cation for the disparate impact on the two communities: because the Greenland Inuit have their own processing 
facility, and the Canadian Inuit rely on commercial processors, there is more risk of  commercial seal products 
sneaking in under the Inuit umbrella with Canadian Inuit products than with Greenland Inuit products. That 
suggests that the finding of  a violation must have a “less restrictive alternative” rationale. Now, the costs and 
benefits here have a quite distinctive structure. So far as the benefits to Inuit culture and the harm to Inuit-hunted 
seals are concerned, there is no difference between the Canadian Inuit and the Greenland Inuit. So if  there 
were no danger of  commercial seal products sneaking in, the EU’s own evaluation, extrapolated from the treat-
ment of  Greenland Inuit seal products, would find a net benefit in admitting Canadian Inuit seal products (the 
additional benefit to Inuit culture would outweigh the additional loss in seal welfare). That means that an attes-
tation program that admitted Canadian Inuit seal products would be a less restrictive alternative as long as it 
could hold the seal-welfare cost from commercial products that “sneak in” below that net benefit. To put it 
another way, the trade-off  the EU has made in dealing with Greenland Inuit seal products (where commercial 
infiltration is not an issue) has the unobvious consequence that, when they consider Canadian Inuit products, 
the EU is not entitled to have a standard of  “zero-risk of  admitting disguised commercial seal products,” which 
is what seems to have motivated their strict segregated-processing requirement. In effect, the tribunals seem to 
have relied on the view that the EU ought to be able to design an attestation program that keeps the commercial 
“leakage” low enough.  
One final point. In a single sentence of  EC—Seal Products, the Appellate Body suggests that the EU is re-
quired to guarantee that Inuit hunts are as humane as reasonably possible.23 This requirement flows naturally 
from the general theory of  rationality that leads to the least restrictive alternative requirement; but it is not an 
application of  the standard least restrictive alternative principle itself. The least restrictive alternative principle 
says that for any specified regulatory benefit, we must minimize the trade cost. But the principle the Appellate 
Body suggests here is that for any specified trade cost (since they are not proposing a way to reduce the trade 
cost), we must maximize the regulatory benefit. In this case, where there are multiple regulatory values, max-
imizing the regulatory benefit requires minimizing the cost to seal welfare of  achieving any specified amount of  
Inuit culture preservation, which is what the Appellate Body calls for. There is an interesting question about 
how the litigation is supposed to proceed under the “maximize the benefit” principle. In traditional less restric-
tive alternative cases, the complainant country is expected to propose less trade-restrictive alternatives, and it 
has a clear incentive to do so. But where we are talking about maximizing the regulatory benefit from a given level 
 
23 Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 1, at para. 5.320. 
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of  trade restriction, the complainant country has no incentive to suggest alternative measures. Nor does the Ap-
pellate Body itself  suggest any specific benefit-increasing measures at this point in EC—Seal Products. If  the 
Appellate Body is asking the regulating country to justify its regulatory choice by “proving a negative” (the 
absence of  any more beneficial measure), the Appellate Body should be deferential in review. 
